

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00082 141946Z

65-61  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W  
----- 057052

P 141910Z MAR 75  
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2486

S E C R E T SALT TWO GENEVA 0082

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS, MARCH 14, 1975

(SALT TWO-562

1. ICBM DEFINITION. EARLY (TO KARPOV A-764) RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET PREFERRED ICBM DEFINITION, WHICH SIMPLY CARRIES FORWARD THE 1972 AGREED INTERPRETATION. EARLE SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE MORE PRECISE RANGE PROPOSED BY THE US, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT GENERAL TRUSOV HAD EMPHASIZED IN HIS STATEMENT TODAY THAT THIS DISTANCE COULD BE ACCURATELY DETERMINE, IN FACT, MORE ACCURATELY THAN WAS NECESSARY. IF IT COULD BE SO ACCURATELY DETERMINED WHY SHOULD NOT THAT ACCURATE DETERMINATION IN TERMS OF KILOMETERS BE USED IN THE DEFINITION RATHER THAN THE WORDY AND SOMEWHAT IMPRECISE LANGUAGE OF THE AGREED INTERPRETATION.

2. KARPOV REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE ANY OF THE ARGUMENTS AND SIMPLY REPEATED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO CHANGE THE LANGUAGE OF THE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00082 141946Z

AGREED INTERPRETATION WHICH BOTH SIDES UNDERSTOOD AND THAT THIS

LANGUAGE WAS PREFERABLE BECAUSE IT REFERRED TO DISTANCE BETWEEN CONTINENTS IN DEFINING AN INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILE.

3. SOVIET ARTICLE VII. TRUSOV (TO ROWNY, A-763) ADMITTED THAT ARTICLE VII OF THE SOVIET DRAFT WAS NOT WITHIN THE LETTER OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE. HOWEVER, HE CONTENDED IT WAS WITHIN THE LETTER OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE. HOWEVER, HE CONTENDED IT WAS WITHIN THE SPIRIT OF VLADIVOSTOK SINCE THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO BLOCK ALL POSSIBLE CHANNELS OF FURTHER COMPETITION. SPECIFICALLY, WE WERE DIRECTED TO PLACE LIMITATIONS ON NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. ROWNY SAID THE SOVIET ARTICLE VII WAS ONE-SIDED SINCE BOTH SIDES KNOW THAT THE US HAS A MODERNICATION AND REPLACE-MENT PROGRAM FOR IT SUBMARINES IN THE OFFING. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS WOULD NOT BE CONSTRAINED BY THE ARTICLE. TRUSOV SAID THE ARTICLE WOULD IMPACT EQUALLY ON BOTH SIDES SINCE THEY, TOO, WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THE 240 SLBM LIMITATION ON NEW TYPE OF SUBMARINES. THEREFORE HE SAID HE FAILED TO SEE WHY THE PROPOSAL WAS ONE-SIDED.

4. ROWNY TOLD TRUSOV THAT IF THE US HAD WISHED TO PLAY THE SAME GAME WE COULD HAVE INTRODUCED INTO OUR DRAFT A LIMIT OF 240 ON NEW NON-HEAVY MISSILES ON EACH SIDE. IN THIS MANNER WE COULD HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE TOTAL OF THEIR SS-17S AND SS-19S BE LIMITED TO A TOTAL OF 240. TRUSOV SAID THAT WAS A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION SINCE WE HAD NOT INTRODUCED SUCH A PROVISION IN OUR DRAFT. ROWNY SAID THE FACT THAT THE US HAD NOT MADE PROPOSALS OF THIS TYPE SHOWED OUR WILLINGNESS TO ABIDE BY THE SPIRIT OF WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED UPON AT VLADIVOSTOK.

5. SOVIET ARTICLE IX. TRUSOV PRESSED ROWNY (A-763) ON ARTICLE IX, ASKING WHICH "NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC ARMS" THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO LIMIT OR BAN. ROWNY SAID THIS WOULD BE HANDLED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. FUTURE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED OR BANNED WOULD DEPEND UPON THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, I.E., THE LIMITATION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEMS POSSESSED BY BOTH SIDES. IF AGREEMENTS ON THESE CURRENT SYSTEMS REFLECTED IN AN EVEN-HANDED MANNER THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, THEN WE WOULD PROBABLY AGREE TO BANNING OR LIMITING CERTAIN NEW TYPES OF SYSTEMS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE SOVIET SIDE INSISTED UPON INCLUDING SUCH UNILATERAL

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00082 141946Z

CONSTRAINTS AS THE 240 SLBM LIMIT ON NEW TYPE OF SUBMARINES THEN THE US WOULD BE DRIVEN TO SEEK EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF SYSTEMS. IN BREAKING UP, ROWNY REMINDED TRUSOV THAT PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE STATES THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT "COULD ALSO PROVIDE" FOR THE ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC ARMS AND THAT ROWNY WOULD EMPHASIZE THE WORD "COULD".

6. VERIFICATION, SHCHUKIN (TO BOOWN-MAY, A-765) OBSERVED THAT THE PROTOCOL IN THE US DRAFT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET SIDE. HE ASSERTED THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WOULD ASSURE THE US THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NO MORE THAN 1320 LAUNCHERS FOR MIRVED MISSILES.

7. BROWN ASKED IF THE US CRITERIA CONTAINED IN THE PROTOCOL WERE USED FOR EVALUATING THE NUMBER OF MIRVS, AND THE PRESENT AND PLANNED SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE IS EVALUATED BY THOSE CRITERIA, WHETHER THE MIRV NUMBERS SO CALCULATED FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND 1985 WOULD EXCEED 1320? SHCHUKIN SAID HE DID NOT KNOW THE FUTURE SOVIET MODERNIZATION PLANS FOR ICBMS AND SLBMS. HE SAID HE BELIEVED MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT WOULD CONTINUE. MISSILES AND SILOS GET OLD AND EVENTUALLY NEED TO BE REPLACED. SHOULD THEY BE REPLACED WITH OLD MISSILES AND SILOS? WOULD THE US REPLACE OLD MINUTEMAN I OR II SILOS WITHOUT CHANGE? HE INDICATED THAT WAS NOT A REASONABLE RESTRICTION. TAKING MODIFICATIONS OR CONVERSIONS AFTER AN ARBITRARY DATE SUCH AS JULY 1970 OR JULY 1973 AS INDICATING MIRV CAPABILITY MADE IT LIKELY THAT AT SOME POINT, BY THE US CRITERIA, ALMOST ALL LAUNCHERS WILL BE COUNTED AS MIRVED, SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN MODERNIZED. THIS APPROACH SEEMED TO HIM TO BE A US RESPONSE TO A POLITICAL PROBLEM THAT THE US HAS.

8. BROWN DREW A GRAPH SHOWING THAT AS TIME WENT ON THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF MIRVS ON THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD RISE AND, ACCORDING TO THE SOVIETS, THE UNCERTAINTIES IN US KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTUAL NUMBER WOULD DECREASE. HE THEN DREW ANOTHER HYPOTHETICAL LINE REPRESENTING WHAT THE US COUNTING RULES MIGHT GIVE, AND NOTED SO LONG AS THAT SECOND LINE REMAINED BELOW THE ALLOWED NUMBER OF MIRV LAUNCHERS THERE SHOULD NOT BE REASON FOR CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 00082 141946Z

9. SHEHUKIN INDICATED THAT THE PROBABLE EVOLUTION OF THESE NUMBERS VERSUS TIME WOULD BE AN INITIAL RISE AND THEN A LEVELING OFF. ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE DISCUSSION AGREED THAT IT WAS UNDESIRABLE TO HAVE SUCH A CURVE FLAT TO BEGIN WITH AND THEN TURN UP SHARPLY. MAY NOTED, AND SHCHUKIN AGREED, THAT WE WANTED TO AVOID REACHING 1985 WITH A HIGH RATE OF INCREASE IN A NUMBER NEAR 1320. SHCHUKIN SUGGESTED THAT THHE NUMBER OF MIRVS MIGHT PEAK BELOW 1320 AND THEN COME DOWN. MAY SUGGESTED THAT SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENTS MIGHT REDUCE THE ALLOWED LEVEL BELOW 1320.

10. SHCHUKIN DESCRIBED THE PROTOCOL AS "THE US POSITION." MAY RESPONDED THAT THE US POSITION WAS TO FIND WITH THE SOVIETS A WAY TO SATISFY BOTH SIDES ON THE MATTER OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF THE MIRV LIMIT. THE US PROTOCOL WAS ONE WAY. THE BEST WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT THIS

WAY OF LOOKING AT THE QUESTION WAS A NEW NONE. MAY RESPONDED  
THAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD SEVERAL TIMES PREFACED HIS REMARKS  
ON THE PROTOCOL WITH A SIMILAR DESCRIPTION. JOHNSON

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, NEGOTIATIONS, RESOLUTIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 14 MAR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** ShawDG  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975SALTT00082  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X1  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750090-0453  
**From:** SALT TALKS  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750349/aaaabscm.tel  
**Line Count:** 172  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ShawDG  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 AUG 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <19 AUG 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <22 DEC 2003 by ShawDG>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS, MARCH 14, 1975 (SALT TWO-562)  
**TAGS:** PARM  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006